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Interpreting Ex—Dividend Evidence:
The Citizens Utilities Case Reconsidered
ABS TRACT
Numerousempirical studies have attempted to measure the effect of changes
in dividend policy on corporate equity values. One of the most popular study
methodologies has'beenan examination of share price changes around ex—dividend
days. Comparingthe movement in astock's price with its nominal dividend
payment leads to estimates of the stock market's relative valuation of dividends
andcapital gains. Ex_day price studies are often interpreted as showing that
investors recognize their tax liabilities and therefore discount their dividend
income. These studies predict that finnswhichreduce their payout ratio should
rise in value, and buttress the view that an increase in dividend taxes would
reduce the value of the stock market.
This study disputes these conclusions by presenting a "counterexample" which
suggests that ex—dividend day studies provide limited insight into the effects of
dividend taxes, or dividend policy, on corporate valuation. I analyze a firm
withtwo different classes of common stock: one class pays taxable cash
dividends, while the other pays untaxed stock dividends. On ex—dividend days,
the taxable—dividend shares experience a price decline equal to about seventy—
five percent of their dividend payment, while the untaxed stock distribution
shares fall by the full value of their dividends. However, the prices of the two
classes of equity do not reflect this apparent market preference for non—taxable
distributions. The average price of taxable—dividend shares is approximately
equal to that of the untaxed dividend shares, indicating that the market
considers the two shares as equivalent.
These findings are important for several reasons. First, they cast doubt on
earlier conclusions, based on ex—dividend day studies, about how a change in
dividend taxes or payout policy would affect the market value of equity capital.
Second, the results may provide new insights which help to explain why firms pay
dividends. They deny the view that investors hold dividend paying stocks only
because they are necessary for diversification, and may suggest that there is
some attribute of cash dividends which investors genuinely value.
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(617) 253-6673The question of how dividend policy affects a firm's market valuation is
central to financial economics. When investors are subject to taxes on both
dividends and capital gains, tax preferences may be an important determinant of a
firm's optimal payout policy. Numerous empirical investigations have attempted
to measure the effect of changes in payout policy on share values. any of these
studies have also tried to predict the effects of changes in personal dividend
taxes on stock market valuation. One of the strongest sources of evidence that
investors consider the tax consequences of their investments and value dividends
less than capital gains is the so—called "ex-dividend" literature. By comparing
changes in stock prices on ex—dividend days with the value of dividend payments,
these studies purport to measure the stock market's relative valuation of
dividend and capital gains income.
The usual finding is that share prices decline by less than their dividend
payout. If these studies are in fact calculati.ng the marginal value of
dividends, then they suggest that firms could raise their share values by
reducing dividends. Alternatively, these investigations imply that high marginal
dividend tax rates depress the stock market, since investors value the after—tax
dividend stream associated with their investments.
Ex—dividend studies have recently been subject to criticism on several
fronts.Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that one of the principal explanations
for previous findings using monthly data, such as the CRSP tapes, involves the
coincidence of ex—dividend dates and dividend announcement dates. Since a
dividend announcement conveys information about a firm's liquidity and possibly
about future profits, it should raise share prices. If a month contains both an
announcement date and an ex—dividend date then there are two opposite—signed2
forces affecting share prices: the information or"announcement" effect raises
the share price, while the dividend payment reduces it. The net effect is that
we observe the share's one month price decline to be less than the value of its
dividend. However, this finding could be perfectly consistent with the share
price declining by the dividend's full value on the ex—day. Miller and Scholes
demonstrate that after controling for these announcement effects, share prices
seemed to decline by amounts much closer to their dividend payout.
The adjustment for announcement effects, although crucial in monthly data,
cannot explain the findings of other ex—dividend studies employing daily data
which also show price changes to be smaller than dividend payments. These
findings pose an unresolved puzzle. Securities dealers, brokers, and untaxed
institutions could all earn arbitrage profits if share prices in fact declined by
less than the dividend. Miller and Scholes argue that the presence of this
arbitrage should prevent the share price change from deviating from dividend
value; the failure of this arbitrage is difficult to explain.
There are other technical criticisms of ex—day studies. Black and Scholes
(1973) showed that much of the unusual return activity which has been discovered
on ex—days disappears as trading periods of more than one day are considered.
While the one-day return from holding a share on its ex—day seems abnormally
high, the twenty—day return associated with buying the share ten days before the
ex—date and selling ten days afterward may not be excessive. Litzenberger and
Ramaswamy (1979,1982) have pointed out the importance of distinguishing between
anticipated and unanticipated dividends in ex—day studies.3
Although these criticisms of ex—dividend study methodology are important,
they do not address the more central question of whether ex—day evidence is
relevant to understanding the effects of dividend policy or dividend taxes.
This paper presents an empirical "counterexasnple" to show that ex—dividend
studies may not provide a reliable guide to the effect of dividend taxes on share
values. The investigation focuses on the share prices and ex—dividend day price
behavior of one firm, Citizens Utilities (Cu), which maintains two different
classes of common stock. Class A shares pay untaxed stock dividends twice each
year, while Class B shares receive taxable cash dividends four times per year.
The company charter requires the two classes of stock to distribute approximately
equal amounts of dividends each year.
The paper begins with a test of the "tax effects" hypothesis, which predicts
that a share's ex—day price decline equals the after-tax value of its dividend
payment. If most investors are either indifferent between dividends and capital
gains, or prefer capital gains, then the price of the taxable-distribution shares
should fall by less than their dividend. The share price for Class A stock
should decline by the full value of the stock dividend. The ex—dividend day
evidence for Citizens Utilities is supportive of the tax effects hypothesis and
consistent with earlier ex—day results.
The ex—day results predict that cash dividend shares should sell at a lower
price than stock—dividend shares. This is where the theory's predictions
unravel. As Long (1978) observed, when averaged over dividend cycles and
adjusted for differences in dividend payout, Class A and Class B shares sell for
almost the same price. While changes in share prices around ex-dates accord with
the "tax effects" hypothesis, the levels of the two share prices do not.4
The stock distribution shares appear to earn a higher return on non ex-days than
the cash dividend shares. While this finding is difficult to reconcile with
standard theories of asset pricing, it does suggest that ex—dividend studies may
provide unreliable answers to basic questions about dividends and taxes. It also
suggests that future dividend research should analyze the return on stocks with
different payout rates during months when they do not pay dividends.
To investigate the Citizens Utilities case, I proceed in five stages. The
paper's first section summarizes models of portfolio equilibrium in the
presence of taxes which give rise to the tax-effects hypothesis. I try to relate
these models to ex-day share price changes. The second section describes the two
classes of Citizens Utilities equity, their tax treatment and their
prices. Empirical evidence concerning the ex—dividend day behavior of CU shares
is presented in the third section, as are several points of econometric
methodology. The fourth section analyzes the trading volume around ex-dividend
days to learn whether any unusual activity, indicative of arbitrage, takes place.
In the fifth section I attempt to pinpoint the paradox of the Citizens Utilities
case and explore several explanations for the divergence between price levels and
ex—day price movements. There is a brief conclusion.
I.Modelling Ex-Dividend Day Price Changes
The after-tax capital asset pricing model1 provides a useful starting
point for the analysis of share price movements. An investor, say investor h, is
1Brennan (1970) is the principle architect of this model. Gordon and Bradford
(1980) and Auerbach (1981) have recently applied it to the study of ex-day share
price movements.5
hhh h. h defined by a vector of characteristics, {w,e ,y}, whereW is total wealth, e
isthe ratio of the investors' after—tax returnson one dollar of dividends and
one dollar of capital gains, and is a measure of marginal risk aversion. If
individual preferences may be characterized bya utility function of means and
variances of asset returns, then
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where is the marginal dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate. If
investors can borrow and lend freely and there areno short selling restrictions




where r is the capital gain on the marketportfolio, dm the dividends paid by
the market portfolio,r0 the risk-free interest rate, r1 and d the capital gain
and dividend on the i- security, and a is the market's valuationof dividends
versus capital gains. Each individual's return on the isecurity is
(1.4) =(1-'r')r. +(1—,)d..6
The rarket's preference for dividends, however, is defined by
hhhhh
(1.5) a =s / e
h h
Individual investor's tax preferences are weighted . theirshare of total
wealth, and rh, their reciprocal risk preference, in computing the market
dividend preference.
Several important insights follow from the after-tax CAPM. First, provided
there are no short selling restrictions, the ex—dividend day price coefficients
on all firms should be the same.1That is
or.
(1.6) =— a all i.
od.
1
Asboth Auerbach (1981) and Gordon-Bradford (1980) note, it is only the presence
of short—selling restrictions or other constraints which produces "clienteles"
across firms. Second, there is no presumption that 0 < a < 1, which is the
assumption of most ex—dividend studies. For some institutional investors, 1,
and for corporations, which are taxed less heavily on dividends than on capital
gains, > 1. Since corporations and institutions are both wealthy (largesi')
and not very risk averse (large 1h), their weight in determining a is large and
in equilibrium, a dollar of dividend income might be valued more than a dollar of
capital gains. Finally, note that if everyone faces the same tax rates, then




Ingeneral, however, it is inappropriate to think of a as the ratio of any
"marginalinvestor's" tax rates; such a marginal investor need not eiist.
The theory which led to equation (1.3) is appropriate for analyzing a share
which pays taxable dividends, such as CU Series B equity. However, if a firm
pays stock dividends, then the appropriate capital—market line becomes
D. Cov(r.,r ) .8) r.t= r0t_p_1
+Var(r) (r+ admt_ r0t) +it
Thestock distribution shares should experience ex—day declines equal to the
value of their dividends.
Previous studies1 of ex—day share price behavior have estimated
equations of the form
P. -P.
I it it—i — I.9) =r.=r.+ ititit
D.t =
rOt_a +P (rt+admt_ r0t) + it—i
Byregressing a share's price change on its' dividend yield and the market
return, we obtain estimates of a, the market's dividend preference. Typical
estimates of a have ranged between .7 and .8 although after correction for
1 Examples of ex—day price studies include Campbell and Beranek (1955), Elton and
Gruber (1970), Black and Scholes (1973), Gordon and Bradford (1980), Green
(1980), Auerbach (1981), Hess (1982), Kalay (1982), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1982), Eades, Hess, and Kim (1982), and Miller and Scholes (1982).a
announcement effects, Miller and Scholes (1982) found a to be approximately
unity.
The finding that most ex—day coefficients arelessthan one leads to an
"arbitrage puzzle" of sorts. While one view holds that differing a's across
firms reflect differences in shareholder clienteles, another argues that such
variations cannot persist, due to the activities of arbitrageurs. I shall
consider each view in turn. Auerbacb (1981) has shown that when some investors
are constrained, the firm's ex—dividend coefficient, a1, i.s defined by
/ ih h hhh
I.1O) a = YILs.y U
h h
where s = forH(i) the set of individuals who invest in the
.th
1 h:hcH(i)
firm. The clientele debate essentially involves two questions. First, does the
set of capital market constraints imposed on investors result in different
clienteles for different firms? Second, are these clienteles in each firm stable
over time, or does the firm's shareholder population change, perhaps around the
ex—date?
The "arbitraguer" view holds that clienteles are unstable over time. Many
institutions, and a small group of individuals,1 face an effective marginal
dividend tax rate of zero. They could earn tax arbitrage profits by trading
shares around ex—dividend days. If there were no transactions costs, the untaxed
investors could purchase the share on the day before the ei-dividend day, receive
1Nontaxable corporate and institutional investors are discussed by Green (1980)
and Auerbach (1981). Miller and Scholes (1978) and Feenberg (1982) examine the
possibility that tax provisions for interest deductability result in some
personal shareholders facing a zero marginal tax rate on dividend income.9
the dividend tax—free, and then re—sell the shares. Share prices would decline
by at least the full value of their dividends in order to eliminate the untaxed
investors' arbitrage profit. Of course, this argument neglects the fact that if
share prices did decline by the full value of dividend payments, high marginal
tax bracket individuals could earn substantial profits by shorting the stock
prior to the ex—day and closing the short position afterwards.
To explain why this arbitrage does not occur, and why share prices fall by
less than dividend payments, some resort to a transactions cost analysis. The
profits from the round—trip ex-day transaction might not cover the cost of
trading. Kalay (1978) estimated the effective commission rate for a large round—
trip transaction in a stock costing $40 per share to be about 0.2% of the share
price. The deviation between a share's ex-day price movement and its dividend








whereis the marginal transaction cost as a fraction of share's price.
This may be rewritten to bound the price change-to—dividend ratio:
E ('+ Dt+i
(1.12)
t t 1 —1< (+ a) ( )
t+1 t
where ô is the opportunity cost term. The deviation between the ex—dividend day
1This bound is different from Kalay's, because it incorporates the risk adjusted
opportunity cost of the transaction. This is the right hand side of expression
(1.11). For plausible values, annual =.20and =.10, .6, this
"opportunity cost" is .06 percent per day.10
price change and —1 cannot exceed the transactions cost plus the opportunity cost
divided by the payout ratio.CitizensUtilities (Class B) quarterly dividends
are equal to approximately two and one half percent of share value. When this
information is combined with Kalay's transactions cost data, the lower bound on
the ratio of the price change to the dividend payout is about 0.90.
If the foregoing analysis correctly described the transactions costs facing
investors with low marginal dividend tax rates, then they should be able to earn
arbitrage profits. One explanation for the absence of this arbitrage is that
holding the shares exposes the arbitrageur to some extra risk for a brief period
around the ex—date. Even if most of this risk is diversifiable, achieving a
fully diversified position may entail still further transactions and brokerage
costs. Therefore the risk adjusted opportunity cost in (1.11) may be an
understatement, and total transactions costs to the arbitrager may greatly exceed
Kalay's estimate. This might imply a much lower bound on the range of admissable
security price changes. For a utility stock such as Citizens Utilities, however,
it is difficult to believe that the excess risk is very large.1
The transactions costs bound may help to explain previous findings of
"clientele" effects. Auerbach (1981), Litzenberger and Raniaswamy (1982) and
1 Kalay's arguments also assume an infinitely elastic security supply. To reduce
transactions costs, however, investors must make large transactions.
Transactions which pay a commission rate of only 0.2 percent of the share price
would require a volume roughly equal to one and one third times CU's average
daily trading voluiie. If the CAPM with homogeneous expectations is replaced by
one with differing beliefs, then there may be a tradeoff between reducing
transactions costs with large trading volumes and inducing price changes,
especially in thin securities markets. This supply curve may explain why
observed ex—dividend day share price movements lie outside the transactions cost
bounds.11
P-P
others have found that tends to decrease (toward —1.0 and often to
t+1
values such as —1.3) as the dividend payout ratio rises.' This is sometimes
interpreted as showing that high payout stocks attract investor clienteles with
low marginal tax rates. An alternative explanation focuses only on the lower






an increase in the dividend payout ratio tightens the bound around -1.0.
Arbitrage is more profitable on firms which pay higher dividends, and this may
explain the observed "clientele".
The central fact which must be reckoned with is that on the ex—day,
different shares experience price changes equal to different fractions of their
dividend. Numerous difficulties arise in the econometric implementation of the
ex—dividend models, and one approach is to attempt to explain the findings as
spurious. There has already been much debate over the measurement of expected
dividends the treatment of shares which trade infrequently, and the stability of
a across firms and across time. This debate will doubtless continue. In the
remaining sections of this paper, I hope to cast doubt on the value of this
debate. Even if we correctly measure the ex-day price effects, we may not learn
a great deal about how dividend policy affects firm valuation. First, however, I
must review the circumstances surrounding my "test firm", Citizens Utilities.
1 Poterba (1983) analyzes theex—day price changes for these high-dividend payout
stocks and concludes that corporation tax preferences for dividends, and other
conventional explanations of ex—day coefficients less than -1, cannot explain
this phenomena.12
II. Class A and Class B: The Citizens Utilities Story1
Two classes of Citizens Utilities shares have been traded since 1956, when
the firm received an I.R.S. ruling allowing it to issue Class A common stock.
Class A shares receive regular stock dividends, which are not taxed upon receipt
but are subject to capital gains taxation when sold. Class B shareholders
receive quarterly cash dividends which are subject to the usual tax rules. When
the Class A shares were issued in 1956, existing shareholders were allowed to
choose which type of equity they wanted and to redeem their outstanding shares on
a one—for—one basis for either Class A or Class B shares.2
Several important characteristics of the two classes of equity are described
below:
(i) Shares of either class carry the same voting rights, and the same
priority in bankruptcy. In the event of a share split, they are split
simultaneously and in the same ratio.
(ii) The corporate charter requires that "whenever a given cash dividend per
share is issued to Series B shares, a stock dividend per share of equal fair
value must be paid during the same calendar year to Series A shares" (Long, 1978,
p. 237).
(iii) Except during the period between the declaration date of Series B
dividends and their ex—date, one share of Series A stock can be converted
1My discussion draws heavily on Long (1978). Readers who are interested in a
more detailed discussion should to consult his paper.
2when the two types of equity were offered, approximately three fourths of the
initial stock in the firm was returned for Class A (stock—dividend) shares. See
"Citizens Utilities Company", Harvard Business School Case #9-204—059 (1959) for
further discussion.13
into one share of Series B stock. The option is not symmetric; Series Bshares
cannot be converted into Series A shares.1
(iv) Citizens Utilities' dividend policy calls for paying only cash
dividends to Series B shares, and only stock dividends to Series A shares. All
Series A share dividends take the form of additional shares of Series A stock.
Shortly after the letter ruling in the CU case, the IRS reversed its
position on the tax rules governing regular stock distributions. In a July 1956
"proposed regulation", the IRS indicated that it would henceforth consider stock
dividends of the type issued by CU to be taxable as cash dividends. The IRS
denied all further requests from corporations attempting to establish two classes
of equity, making the Citizens Utilities case somewhat unique. In 1958, the IRS
indicated in a letter to Citizens Utilities that it would not rescind the
company's special tax status and even suggested that in the event of a
Congressional amendment to the 1954 Tax
1 The prohibitionon exchanging shares between the declaration and ex—dates lies
at the heart of Citizens Utilities Class A tax—exempt status. The IRS in 1956
held that when the shareholder is permitted to elect to receive [a particular
dividend in cash or stock ...{thatdividend] is taxed to him exactly as a cash
dividend would be —asordinary income on the receipt of shares". ("Citizens
Utility Company", pp. 4—5). The 1955 Citizens Utilities Annual Report explains:
"Prohibitions of conversion from Series A to Series B shares during the period
between dividend declaration and record dates proscribes shareholder election
during that interval in which election is significant. Conversion to JSeries B
during that period would enable the converting Series A shareholder to secure the
right to receive the cash dividend declared on the Series B. Obviously, if
shareholders convert Series A into Series B shares at times other than the
interval between dividend declaration and record dates —asthey are freely able
to do, under the terms of our unique two—series common stock capitalization —
theyobtain no rights to any individual dividend, since none has been declared.
The very absence in our charter of any absolute requirement that dividends on
either Series be in cash or stock, plus the banning of conversion from Series A
to Series B between dividend declaration and record dates, were decisive factors
in the issuance of our historic, favorable tax ruling by the Internal Revenue
Service in the first place."14
Code, there would probably be a "grandfather clause" protecting the Citizens
Utilities exemption. 1ben Congress finally implemented the IRS proposed
regulation as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, it specifically allod stock
distribution plans of the Citizens Utilities type to maintain their tax-exempt
status until December 31 ,1990.This eliminated the uncertainty about the date
at which Series A shares would lose their tax-favored status.
Two further aspects of the Citizens Utilities case deserve mention. First,
the dividends on the two classes of stock are paid at different times and
different frequencies. Class B shares receive quarterly cash dividends, while
Class A stock distributions are made only semi-annually. These asynchronous
dividend patterns give rise to movements in the relative price of Citizens
Utilities shares.The relative price of Class A shares is highest just before a
stock distribution and lowest just before a Class B cash dividend payment.
A more important point for later analysis is that the firm has not
distributed strictly equal dividends on Class A and Class B equity. Long (1978,
p. 240) reports that "in interpreting the 'equal fair value' requirement in the
charter amendment, the firm has very consistently declared the semi-annual Series
A stock dividends in amounts such that the market value of any given per share
stock dividend is about ten percent greater than the cash dividends per share on
Series B stock in the corresponding half year".
Table I displays the annual average price and dividend payment for Class A
and Class B shares for the last decade. The average dividend payment on Class A15
TABLE I
CU Share Price Statistics
Class A Class B
Average Dividends Average Dividends Average Price
Year Price Paid Price Paid (Class A/Class B)
1972 37.47 1.56 34.20 1.37 1.099
1973 36.81 1.71 35.18 1.60 1.046
1974 25.64 1.96 25.25 1.76 1.018
1975 28.31 2.10 26.86 1.88 1.055
1976 32.73 2.22 30.16 2.00 1.085
1977 36.49 2.35 32.75 2.14 1.115
1978 37.53 2.58 33.43 2.34 1.123
1979 37.87 2.93 33.18 2.56 1.144
1980 35.23 3.10 30.29 2.74 1.167
1981 32.85 3.35 29.80 2.92 1.104
1982 37.08 1.67* 33.74 1.54* 1.099
*For only the first half of 1982
Notes: Dividend value for stock distributions was computed using the
procedure outlined by Long (1978). Data provided courtesy of Data
Resources, Inc. The prices reported in the relative prices of
Class A and Class B shares which take place during the year.16
shareswas 1.12 times that on Class B shares.' The average relative price of
Class A shares, in terms of Class B shares, was 1.10. The stock market value of
Class A shares is therefore slightly less than would beexpectedif the shares
were priced inproportionto their dividend payments. There issubstantial
variationin thetwo share's relative prices over the investigation period.
ClassA share prices have averaged as much as sixteen percent greater than Class
B during a one year period, and the two have at other times been separated by
only a two percent differential. The relative price of Class A shares rose
through the mid-1970's, peaking in 1980.2
Some explanation of the dividend payment differential can befoundinearly
descriptionsof the Citizens Utilities dual capitalization plan:
The size of the stock dividend, Mr. Rosenthal said, will be
calculated by taking the market price of CU common shares on
the day the dividend is declared; this price would be reduced
by the estimated amount the shares would drop in value if all
shareholders receiving dividends in stock turned around and
sold them on the market. The depressed price is then divided
into the size of the cash dividend, and the resulting figure
is the fractional share of stock to be paid in place of cash.
[Wall Street Journal, 5 January 1956, p. 15].
The notorious difficulty in predicting the amount by which share prices will
change in response to large trading volume makes challenging the company's
interpretation of "equal fair value" a delicate matter.
1 The value of Class A dividends was computed following Long (1978) as -4-DEC'
where 8 =fractionalshare distribution per existing share and DEC is the share
price on the declaration date. If an investor owning N shares were to sell N
shares before the ex—date he would receive a stock dividend at rate 8 on holdings
of (1— --)N shares. His position after the ex-day is therefore (i-4i5)
(1—1-)N
=N,so he retains the same number of shares as before.
2 I shall not speculate as to whether this reflects the gradual dissemination of
the information in John Long's 1978 paper.17
The practice of marking—up the current spot price in declaring stock dividends is
a common practice. It is designed to protect shareholders against sudden price
movements, possibly caused by block trading.
Moreover, it is clearly in the company's interest to pay higher dividends on
Class A shares. If the price of A shares were to remain substantially below the
price of B shares for an extended period, there would be pressure to convert A
shares to B shares for an arbitrage profit. However, the conversion away from
Class A would deny CU its pooi of retained earnings and subject it increased cash
dividend demands. To avoid this conversion risk, the managers might attempt to
pay higher dividends on Class shares.'
III. The Ex-Dividend Behavior of CU Share Prices
III. A.Standard Ex-Dividend Tests.
The ex—dividend day price behavior of CU shares was investigated using daily
data on the closing prices of Series A and Series B shares for the period January
7, 1972 to October 5,1982.There were a total of 2,697 observations on closing
prices during this period.2 Class A shares declared 21 dividends, while Class B
1Most of the shares outstanding are Class A shares: 82.3%. This would give a
policy which explicitly reduced the value of Class B shares support from a
majority of the shareholders, but its illegality under the terms of the company
charter would probably make any explicit policy impossible.
2Almost all ex—day studies are plagued by non-availability of data on
transactions prices. By using closing prices, we run the risk of interpreting
for example, movements from one side to another of the 'bid-ask spread" as an ex—
day price change. However, as I show in the Appendix, these difficulties lead an
errors-in-variable problem which may be treated by using instrumental variables
estimators.18
shares went ex—dividend 43times.The larger nuber of er—dates for the cash
distribution sharesis due to their quarterly payout policy.







whereR1t is the one-day market return, measured by the one day change in the
value of the NYSE composite stock price index.1In this equation, 2 will
CUMKT CU estimate while estimates a
Var (RT) 1
Ex—dividend equations were estimated for both classes of CU shares, and are
reported in Table Il—A. Payment of a one dollar dividend on the stock—
distribution shares reduces their price by about ninety cents. By comparison,
the cash distribution share price seems to decline by oniy about seventy six
cents when a one dollar dividend is paid. This finding is consistent with the
predictions of the "tax effects" hypothesis, since the price change is smaller
for the taxable dividend payments than for the tax-free share distributions.
However, the difference is not very large.
1 Since theremay be a nontrading problem in share prices, as outlined by Scholes
and Williams (1977), I have included both the current and the one—period lagged
value of the market return. While the findings with respect to ex-dividend
coefficients do not charge substantially when the lagged market return is
included, the coeffient on this variable is significantly different from zero and
I have therefore kept it in the specifications.19
The market return is included in ex—dividend day price equations such as
(111.1) in order to measure the change in a share's price which is attributable
to systematic market forces. A more accurate indicator of the systematic forces
affecting each class of Citizens Utilities shares is readily available, however:
it is the return on the other class of CU stock. To explain changes in the price
of Class A shares, therefore, I use a specification such as
AA DA









B. where superscripts A or B refer to the different share classes and Rt is the
return on Class B shares, measured as the price change plus the dividend payout.
Once again I include lagged values of Rt and RB to treat non-trading effects.
Results of estimating these specifications are reported in Table Il—B, and are
only slightly different from the findings with specification (111.1). The
estimated ex—dividend coefficient for Class B shares rises to —.755, while that
for Class A falls to —.947.The difference between these two coefficients is
barely significant at the 95% confidence level.
There is a puzzle in these findings, however. The coefficient on the "other
return" variables, of (111.2), is substantially less than one for both shares.
One explanation for this finding may be that share prices are measured with
error, inducing a classical errors—in-variables bias which forces the
coefficients closer to zero. I expected the returns on the two shares to be very
close to equal; after imposing this restriction, I obtained the following
estimates:TABLE 11-A








































Notes: The dependent variable is the share price change on the ex—
dividendday, as a fraction of the preceeding day's price,
p)/p. The equations are estimated usingdaily
data for the period 1972:007 to 1982:301, for a total of 2697
observations. The estimates were computed using two—stage
least squres; for further discussion, see the appendix.
Standard errors are shownin parenthesis.For further data
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-= —.97—.i4 P2 =.0261
Pt-i (1.98) (.087) pt-i SSR =.2812
These findings suggest that Citizens Utilities shares behave in a fashion which
is consistent with the tax—effects hypothesis. Shareholders appear to value
taxable cash distributions less than they value tax—free stock distributions.1
These findings provide evidence against Black and Scholes' (1973) claim that
one reason the market values dividends is because some types of return streams
could only be obtained by purchasing shares which pay dividends. Because of
their attractive diversification properties, investors might hold dividend
shares in spite of their payout policy. This cannot explain the demand for
Citizens Utilities Series B shares. Any individual who faced a higher tax rate
on dividend income than on capital gains could obtain the return stream
corresponding to Citizens Utilities without bearing the dividend tax liability.
The non—zero implicit marginal tax rate on cash dividends, however, may suggest
1 In their analysis of ex-day share price movements, Black and Scholes (1973)
found that while there were excess returns to shares on their ex—dividend day,
these returns disappeared if the holding period was extended to include several
days before and after the ex-date. When my equations were re-estimated for
holding periods of 20 and 40 days the ex—day coefficients were unstable and
sometimes reversed the pattern found on the ex-day.23
that some investors choose to hold the tax dis—favored shares to obtain the
benefit of steady dividend income.
As a final test of the ex—dividend day behavior of CU shares, I attempted to
learn whether on the ex—days of Class A shares, the price of Class B shares
exhibited any unusual behavior. I examined this proposition by including the
dividend payments of both shares in the regressions explaining each share's price
movements. The results are reported in Table III. Except in one case, there
appears to be no systematic effect of one share's dividends on the other's price
movements. A large and statistically significant effect occurs when the price
behavior of Class A shares is being explained by the total return on Class B
DB
shares. The estimated coefficient onBt )issignificantly negative, —.183.
1
However, this is not a finding that ex-dividend days for Class B shares affect
Class A share prices. Rather it reflects the earlier finding that in computing
the return on Class B shares, the market assigns a lower value to cash dividend
distributions than to capital gains. Thus, the finding just says that in
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In a similar spirit, I regressed the difference in the two shares' returns on
their dividend payouts. Such a specification could be derived from the after—tax
CAPN by using one share's return to substitute out the market risk variables.
Since both series of CU shares possess identical risk theoretically profiles,
their risk—adjusted after tax returns should be the same. My estimates are shown
below.
A B DA
Rt_ Et =.0001-.252 B
+.014
(.0000) (.088) t-1 (.063) pt-i
While there is clear evidence that dividends paid on Class B shares must be
"devalued", so that a for Class B is less than one, the hypothesis that dividends
and capital gains on Class A shares receive equal weight cannot be rejected.
These findings confirm the large body of pre-existing ex—day literature, and lead
inexorably to the usual conclusion that CU could raise its market value by
cutting its dividend on Class B shares.
III. B. Some Econometric Issues.
All of the preceding equations have been estimated under the standard
assumptions of the general linear model. However, the stochastic process
-
generatingshare price movements may not satisfy these assumptions. The
particular issues which I shall focus or involve changes over time in the
variance of returns. If prices are more volatile around event days than on non-
event days, the coefficient standard errors reported by least squares will be
inappropriate for making inferences about the ex—day model. Because these26
standard errors are computed using the average residual variance over the entire
data sample, they will not reflect the greater uncertainty which attaches to
price movements around ex-dates. If all of the events whose effects we wish to
measure occur during these periods of abnormal volatility, our confidence in the
results must be smaller than it would be if the events occurred in other, lower
return variance periods.
This problem is a form of heteroscedasticity since the residual variance is
related to one of the independent variables, the dividend payout. To explore its
importance, I regressed the squares of residuals from the equatioss in Table 11—B
on a dummy variable corresponding to the ex-dividend day:
Class A shares: e =.822+.890EXDAYA
(.047) (.535)
Class B shares: e =.827+.440EXDAYB
(.053) (4.29)
The return variance on ex—days is larger for both shares; for Class A shares, it
is more than twice as great as the residual variance on nonex=days. Class B
returns display a somewhat less pronounced increase, about fifty percent. A
general test against heteroscedasticity, proposed by White (1980), was also
computed for each return equation by regressing the squared residuals on the set
of independent variables. The tests resoundingly rejected the null hypothesis of
homoscedastic errors
1 The calculated statistics are TR2 from theregression of e on the explanatory
variables in the returns model for the Class A and Class B equations,
respectively. These statistics are distributed as under the null of
homoscedasticity; the 99% confidence value is 16.81. The actual test values
were between 30 and 90.27
Thefinding of substantial heteroscedasticity led me to re-estimate the
standarderrors for the returns equations using White's (1980)
heteroscedasticity—consistent procedure. The resulting equations, with both OLS
and White—consistent statndard errors, are shown below:
(t)A =1.11-.946 +.652 +.035R1 +.131 +.095
(1.81) (.058) (.015) (.015) (.021) (.021)
White
Standard (1.80) (.083) (.036) (.028) (.027) (.025)
Errors
(t) =.463-.753()+ .627 +.012 +.065 .036
(1.78) (.078) (.015) (.014) (.020) (.021)
White
Standard (1.80) (.088) (.030) (.020) (.026) (.024)
Errors
While all but one of the estimated standard errors increase, the effect on the
dividend payout's precision is particularly pronounced. The standard error in
the Class A equation increases by nearly fifty percent; that in the model for
Class B returns rises by a smaller amount. After making these corrections the
difference between the ex—dividend coefficients on Class A and Class B shares
remains statistically significant at a 10%, but not a 5%, confidence level.
However, the implications of excess volatility around event days extend far
beyond the present study. If this proves to be a general tendency in security
returns data, then many conclusions and inferences based on previous studies may
require re-examination.28
A second patternwhichI discovered in the residuals from my return model
was persistence of excess volatility. Days on which returns were unusually noisy
were, on average, followed by days with highly variable price movements. This can
be seen from the following residual-square regressions:
Class A: e= .472 +.726EXDAYA +1.94eti+ .072 c-2.080 .073 .034
(.051) (.512) (.019) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.019)
Class B: e .497 +.488EXDAYB +.108e?tj+ .077 e1+ .089 e3
(.583) (.423) (.019) (.019) (.119)
Only lagged values which were statistically significant were retained in these
equations. Serial correlation in the residual variances can make ordinary least
squares estimation highly inefficient.' Perhaps more importantly, however,
persistence in security return variances may require modifications in standard
option pricing and other security valuation rules.
IV. Transactions Volume around the Ex-Date
Taxarbitragearound ex-dividend days may change the firm's clientele,
thereby reducing the effective tax rate on the firm's dividends. If this
arbitrage were taking place, then it should be detectable from a study of the
trading volume in CU shares. Green (1980) studied shares in the Dow Jones index
and found some evidence of unusual trading activity around ex—dates, particularly
"acceleration" of trades. Volume seemed unusually high on the few days
preceeding the ex—date. Volume tests should play a major role in future ex—day
investigations, since they provide one of the few mechanisms for understanding
whether firms actually face stable shareholder clienteles.
1Engle (1982) discusses these problems, which he refers to as "Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedasticity," and demonstrates in some cases OLS becomes infintely
inefficient relative to maximum likelihood. While procedures for estimating models
with ARCH exist, I have not yet explored their application.29
To examine CU volume fluctuations, I estimated two regression models. The
first, based on Green's approach, focussed only on trading activity within one
week of the ex—date:








VOLUMEis the transactions volume in either Class A or Class B shares, EXDIVA and
EXDIVB are indicator variables for ex—dividend dates, and NYSEVOL is the trading
volume on the New York Stock Exchange.1 The 6. and it.coefficientsmeasure the 1
deviationof volume from its average level, where EXDIVA
2for example is an
indicator variable for days which are two trading days before the ex-day.
The results of estimating this model for the period 1972—1982 are shown in
Table IV. Although each type of share is unusually active on its ex-date, the
volume differences above normal are not statistically significant. The stock
distribution (Class A) shares experience volume eighteen percent above average on
their own ex-dates, and Class B shares' volume is up by about 22% on their ex—
date. These effects are substantial, even if statistically insignificant. I












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































also explored the "cross—effects" of one share's ex—date on the other share's
volume. While ex dates for Class A shares seems to raise Class B share volume,
the reverse appears to be true on Class B distribution days: Class A volume
declines. There is no pronounced volume pattern before and after the ex—dates.
There are two difficulties with this simple volume model. First, our
attention should not be confined only to the few days around the ex-date. There
are sound reasons for activity to increase far in advance of the ex—date. For
example, corporate dividend receipts are eligible for the 35% tax exemption only
if the corporation has held the shares for a period of more than 15 days before
the ex—date. This might lead to excess trading 16 days before the ex—day. The
second problem is that when trading volume rises for a period of several days, it
may be impossible to identify an increase on any particular day around the ex—
date but easy to find a sizable "week before" effect. These concerns led to an
alternative specification designed to capture trading movements further from the
ex—date:
(IV.2)VOLUME =8+5 EXDiVA to —10) + ô2 EXD1VA(11 to —2O
83 EXDIVA(+ 1 to +10) + 84 EXDIVA(+11 to
111 DIVB(1 to -10) + + 114 EXDIVB(+11to +2O) 150L
+ c.
The indicator variables on the right hand side now correspond to ten day
intervals around the ex-date.
The results of estimating (IV.2) are reported in Table V. There is some
evidence of unusual trading activity in Series A shares. Trading appears to be








(—20 to—ii) (.95) (1.82)
EXDIVA -.16 2.71




(1to 10) (.95) (1.82)
EXDIVA -.11 2.93
(ii to 20) (.95) (1.82)
EXDIVB -.85 -3.01
(—20 to —ii) (.77) (1.47)
EXDIVB .76 -2.14




(1to 10) (—.76) (1.46)
EXDIVB .84 1.59
(ii to 20) (.77) (1.46)
NYSE Volume -1.27 -.476
(.600) (1.14)
.004 .005
Notes:Both equations are estimated for the period 1972:007 —1982:270
using daily data on the volume of each share's trading. The
explanatory variables are dummy variables for periods around the ex—
date. For example, EXDIVA (—20 to -11) is 1 on days which are
between 20 and 11 trading days before the ex—date of Class A
shares.33
stock.This effect is statistically significant at the 95% level. Similarly,
activity is almost ten percent below normal in the twenty days preceeding an ex-
date for Series B shares. Trading in Class A shares rises after the Series B ex—
date.
Class B shares exhibit much less unusual trading activity around ex—dates.
Almost all of the indicator variables' coefficients are substantially less than
their standard errors. In addition, the coefficients are small; even if they
were precisely estimated, they would not suggest particularly substantial volume
movements. The absence of Class B trading undermines the "tax arbitrage" theory
of ex--day behavior. While there should be trading around the ex-date for shares
with taxable distributions, there is no evidence that this trading actually
occurs for Citizens Utilities. The excess trading volume for Class A shares is
puzzling, since there are few tax advantages to be gained by trading around the
ex—date.
One explanation for the absence of trading activity is CU's size. While
CitizensUtilities is monitored by Value Line and several investment firms, and
there is some interest in CU for its unique capitalization, it does not appear to
attract active trading interest in many firms.1Thismay reflect a thin market
for the firm's shares, and may suggest that any attempts to take advantage of
arbitrage profits would result in substantial share price changes and thereby
become unprofitable.
Whiletradingvolumedatashow no clear signs of changes in the firm's
clienteles around ex—dividend days, it is still of soiae interest to examine the
1 The 1982 Directory of Security Research lists only one analyst as a contact for
Citizens Utilities, and she informed me in a telephone interview that she does
not actively follow the company's shares. I also learned that the company is
rarely traded by institutional investors, and that its primary market consists of
"retail investors".34
shareholder composition of Class A and Class B shares. Unpublished data,
provided by Citizens Utilities, disaggregating shareholders into several
categories is shown in Table VI. Interpretation of shareholder information such
as this must proceed cautiously, since many of the "brokers" holdings are
probably beneficial holdings which should ultimately be assigned to individuals
or institutions. There is some evidence that individuals hold a larger fraction
of the outstanding Class A than Class B shares. Nominees and Institutions hold a
smaller amount of the A shares. In addition, the individuals holdings of A
shares are in substantially larger blocks than the B shareholdings. The
investment value of the typical individual A—shareholders' position is roughly
two and one half times the size of the average Class B shareholding.
Some further insights into the role of the tax clienteles in the stock
market derives from the shareholder survey conducted by CU's Chairman, Richard
Rosenthal, in 1955. Shareholders were asked which type of dividend policy they
preferred: all stock, all cash, or a mix of the two. Sixty eight percent of the
shareholders participated in the survey; of the respondents, 55% voted for all—
stock dividends, 38% for the half stock-half cash plan, and 7% desired all cash
dividends.1 However, Business Week reported
The all-cash minority is a powerful one because its
shares are concentrated in large blocks in the hands of
a few investment trusts and other institutional
investors. Its preference is one reason why




Table Six: Clienteles in Citizens Utilities Shares





Fraction of Shares Held By:
Individuals .646 .541
Fiduciaries .065 .070





Brokers and Nominees 13,366.00 5,547.10
NOTES: Data were kindly provided by the Illinois Stock Transfer Company,
after Mr. Richard Rosenthal, Chairman of the Board of Citizens



































Notes: The dependent variable is the share price change on the ex—dividend
day, as a fraction of the preceeding day's price, (P —
Theequations are estimated using daily data for the period 1972:007
to 1982:301, for a total of 2697 observations. The estimates were
computed using two—stage least squares; for further discussion, see
the appendix. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. For further




stockholders are getting the choice of a cash-paying as
well as a stock-paying category. [Business Week,
January 14, 1956, P. 107].
These bits of anecdotal evidence suggest that stock market clientelesmay exist.
However, the fact that many CU shareholders in 1955 wished to receive both cash
and stock dividends is difficult to reconcile with rational behavior taking
account of taxes.1
V.Pinpointing the Paradox
Ex—day price changes for Citizens Utilities shares suggest that investors
value taxable cash dividends less than they value non—taxable distributions.
However, the relative prices of the two classes of equity do violence to these
predictions. While the ex-day evidence suggests that after adjustment for
different levels of dividends the taxable dividend shares should sell for about
twenty percent less than the nontaxable shares, their average price during the
last 10 years has been two percent greater than the price of Class A shares.
The paradox is that the ex-day behavior of the two shares is inconsistent with
their relative prices. On days between dividend payments, the return on Class B
shares must be lower than the return on Class A shares. This is a significant
result, suggesting that the rate of return which investors demand on different
shares may depend upon their dividend policy-, even on days when no dividends are
paid. Findings such as this are difficult to reconcile with standard theories of
asset pricing.
1Some institutions such as pension funds might face identical (zero) tax rates on
both sources of income. However, their CU shareholdings are substantially below
the fraction of investors who voted for a half—and—half policy in 1955. The
annual reports often reveal letters from investors who hold both classes of CU
shares ("one for dividends, one for capital appreciation.") This is also
difficult to square with strict tax—clientele theories.36
Beforedrawing conclusions from the CU case, it is important to explore any
features of the two shares which could explain their paradoxical prices. First,
the eventual expiration of Series A shares' dividend tax exemption could affect
the shares' relative prices. While the difference between Class A and Class B
ex-day price movements should reflect the difference between marginal dividend
and capital gains tax rates, the difference between the share prices should
reflect the discounted value of the tax savings. For example, if the two shares
were identically taxed on all dividend payments except one, then prices would be
almost the same but they might experience widely different changes, as a fraction
of their dividend, on that dividend ex—day.
Assuming that the Class A shares' tax exemption will be eliminated in 1990,1
we can calculate the value of each share.
1990 W (\






where a is the market's relative value of dividends and capital gains. If
A B D =KD,forK =1.10in the Citizens Utilities case, then
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where g is the growth rate of Class A dividends. The relative price of the two
shares should approach K as the date of expiration nears.2 We would predict that
There is some chance that Congress will choose to extend the grandfather clause,
allowing CU a tax exemption after 1990.
2 If on expiration the two shares become identical so that there could be no
differences in dividends, then the price ratio would approach unity.37
the prices of Class A and Class B shares would have become closer in the last 10
years, However, as Table I shows, the prices have in fact diverged during the
last few years. This is prima facie evidence against the prospect of tax—exempt—
expiration driving the price movements.
Further evidence comes from evaluating the relative price in expression
(v.3).Assumingthat Class A dividends will rise at 8 percent per year until
1990, treating a =.75, thepayout rate on Class B shares as 10 percent, and
assuming an after—tax nominal discount rater of .10, the 1982 relative price of
Class A and Class B shares would be 1.32. The observed 1982 price ratio is 1.10,
which is substantially less than the calculations predict. The importance of
this calculation is that the two shares' similar prices cannot be attributed
solely to the expected expiration of Series A's tax exemption.
An alternative explanation of the share's equal valuation is that investors
fail to perceive the tax system's important role. This seems unlikely since the
annual report for each year contains a discussion of the advantages of "unique
Two-Series Capitalization". The 1981 Report, for example, explains that:
Series B shares meet the needs or desires those investors to whom
conventional cash dividends are attractive, because their
circumstances are such that they pay modest to no taxes on them.
Our Series A shares have particular attraction to those investors
whose purpose is to compound their investment at no additional
cash cost and without taxation during the compounding period.
[Citizens Utilities (1981), p. 46].
Investors who study the corporate documents should be aware of the tax issues
surrounding choice of share type, and ignorance should not explain the price
behavior.
The clienteles, as discussed in the last section, might provide a partial
explanation. The puzzle for any clientele theory is why observed ex-day price38
changes appear to suggest that Class B dividends are worth onlyseventy five
percent of their nominal value. Some investors are paying a substantial tax
price for the priviledge of receiving cash distributions. Clienteles shouldform
readily in CU shares since the problem of finding equivalent-risk high and low
payout stocks does not arise. Both classes of shares should be equallyrisky, so
investors should be able to choose the income stream which theyprefer for tax or
other reasons, without concern for risk differentials.
The central result of comparing these shares is that even if clienteleshave
formed for the two shares, they have not completely eliminated the taxarbitrage
opportunities. One explanation of this phenomenon which should not be ignored is
that Citizens Utilities is too small to make tax arbitrage ahighly profitable
activity. Investors who specialize in exploiting these tax differentialsmay
focus on stocks which admit large positions with relatively smallchanges in
price. This may not be possible for Citizens Utilities.
Conclusions
A burgeoning literature has focussed on the accurate measurement ofex-day
price effects, but there have been few attempts to assess the value of these
investigations. The Citizens Utilities paradox raises substantial doubts
concerning the usefulness of ex—dividend day share price studies. While the
stock market's valuation of the dividends paid by the two classes of shares is
quite different, its valuation of the two shares is almost identical. This
suggests that using ex-day studies to draw inferences about the effect of
alternative dividend policies, or dividend tax regimes, on share valuescan be
misleading. The results also call into question the extent to which tax39
arbitrage affects ex-day price changes. For one class of Citizens Utilities
shares, ex—day price movements are substantially less than the value of
dividends.
The findings suggest some leads for the explanation of corporate dividend
poUcy. "Signalling" theories cannot explain the premium on Class B shares,
since the payment of cash dividends on Class B shares can be observed by both
Class A and Class B shareholders. Owners of the taxable dividend shares acquire
no more information than owners of stock—dividend shares. The most plausible
explanation of the relative price behavior of CU shares rests on a fundamental
preference, by some classes of investors, for cash dividends. For some small
investors, this preference may be due to current consumption needs and the high
transactions costs associated with small portfolio liquidations. Other
investors, trusts and some institutions, may value current income more than
capital appreciation. Studies of how important these investors are should
constitute a substantial part of the future research program on dividend payout.40
APPENDIX
Stochastic Specification in Share Price Models
Share transactions take place in units of eighths of a dollar. At any moment,
a security's recorded price is not its market clearing price. The market clearing prices
and recorded prices are linked by a "measurement error" attributable to round—price
trading:
(i) +
where is the recorded price, P is the market clearing price, and is an error
term which is not greater than12.5cents in absolute value. There may also be errors
in share prices which are closing prices and not actual transaction prices.
To analyze the econometric significance of these measurement errors, consider the
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where z = Thetrue model specifies that y aa1xt+ t' while we estimate
t—1/
(a0,a1)byleast squares on the augmented equation
(6) t a+ a(xt_ zc1) + v_ wtc + aiztcti.
It is clear that the explanatory variables are correlated with the error; this will
lead to inconsistent estimates.
I shall focus on the inconsistency of arThisestimator is
(7) plima1= plim (x_ ze1)2]' (x_ zc1))]
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The first bracketed term is the noise
ratio for the independent variable, the
noise + signal42
dividend—payoutratio. It is reminiscent of the usual result forregression models
inthe presence of measurement error: the coefficientsare biased toward zero, and
the probability limits of the estimators are the truecoefficient values times one
minus the noise to signal ratio. The second bracketed termmodifiestheusual errors—
in-variable expression, because there is a spurious correlationbetween the measured
dependent and independent variables. An altenative expression showsthis more clearly:
xx xx (9) plima1= a1[_ 2Ql + [i 2Q]
Thesecond term depends uponQ/Q,the regression coefficient of on zt.
These variables,w and z, are coefficients in the Taylor expansions for the
independent and dependent variables in terms of the measurementerrors. The estimated
a1therefore will be biased by increasingly large amounts as these linear terms become
more highly correlated. Provided the dividend—price ratio exhibitssome variation,
this second term is unlikely to vanish andresulting coefficients may be contaminated.
A consistent estimation procedure can bedeveloped by employing instrumental
variables. Since lagged values of prices contain measurementerrors which are
uncorrelated with current prices, but systematic components whichare highly
correlated,1 they provide particularly good instruments. Theresults which are
Dt Dt reported in the text correspond to IV estimatorsusing , , etc.as
t—2t-3
instruments.
The efficient markets hypothesis predicts thatmarket—clearing prices evolve according to a random walk, or something close to it. Thismeans the correlation between pastmarket-clearing prices and current prices is particularly high.43
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